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INTRODUCTION

Bad boilerplate can shake one' s faith i n evolution; not only does it not
die away, it multiplies. The puzzle is why. Much of boilerplate is ambigu
ous or incomprehensible. This alienates consumers and is i ncreasingly
punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There
must, therefore, be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The
popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising lan
guage that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require
consumers to do three things they do not do-read the language, under
stand it, and take comfort in it.
There is a hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate, but the trick lies in
the courts, not the consumer. The trick is a private conversation between
drafters and courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could
have no fair duty to understand, and so has no duty to read. With the con
sumer out of the room, edits and additions to boilerplate are targeted to
courts alone. The new language does not need to make sense to a layman.
It does not even need to make sense standing alone; a judge will read the
language in the context of precedent, with the aid of briefing.

*

Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. -Ed. Thanks to David
Bernstein, Lloyd Cohen, Ross Davies, Bruce Kobayashi, Kimberly Moore, Nicholas Quinn Rosenk
ranz, Omri Ben-Shahar, Eugene Volokh, and the participants of this symposium for their insights. I
am grateful to the George Mason Law and Economics Center for generous support.
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Boilerplate, used widely, repeatedly, applied u niformly to all, is like a
1
2
broad statute, or the First Amendment. An innocent first reader is not on
notice that the true meaning of the words is found in the case law. Drafters
do not use this language to trick consumers, however, because they no
longer care what consumers think of the language. Drafters value boilerplate
because courts know what it means.
This Article evaluates the continued abstruseness of boilerplate language
despite incentives, j udicial and otherwise, for clarity. Several rules and pat
terns of judicial interpretation aim for clarity, but perversely result in
continuity. The linguistic community dwindles to the court and the drafter
alone, cutting out the nondrafter, reader, or consumer. This drives drafters
deeper and deeper into the arms of existing case law as a primary means of
selecting clauses. The danger is that while some consumers may not read the
contract, none will read the case law in which any particular tum of phrase
is embedded. Precedents speak to the drafter, not to the reader.
The problem is in fullest bloom in the insurance context. Insurers will
cling for decades to language that courts continually declare ambiguous and
construe against the insurer. Why, in the face of this history, insurers have
chosen not to clarify the language, or to stop using it, courts "cannot con
3
ceive of an answer.'' What the court does not realize is that it has fired its
last shot, and the insurer knows it.
Any discussion of insurance law is by necessity a discussion of contract
law. Some of the discoveries and conclusions of this piece apply equally
well to ordinary contract law, or even serve as a warning about the future of
consumer contract law. History suggests that where the subspecialty of in
surance doctrine leads, ordinary contract doctrine may follow. Far from
being the dull cousin of the contract family, insurance is the odd but brilliant
prodigy. The law of insurance often deviates from basic contract law at pre
cisely the point where insurance contracts typify the modem consumer
contract-boilerplate clauses, little negotiation, written in legalese, and re
ceived by the consumer only after the contract has begun.
Insurance is of course more than j ust the ultimate consumer contract be
cause insurance contracts have their own qualities. Nonetheless, if courts
view consumer contracts as disreputable, they view insurance contracts as
downright seedy. The result is that insurance law is often the crucible in
which new legal approaches to protecting the consumer are formed; more
aggressive applications of existing doctrine may arise in the insurance con
4

text and return with new vigor when applied to other consumer contracts.

I.

See, e. g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

2.
"Congress shall make no law respecting
free exercise thereof . . . ."U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. New Castle County, Del.
(3d Cir. 200 I).
4.

v.

an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 755

The Arizona Supreme Court describes one such example:

Artificial results derived from application of ordinary rules of contract construction to insur
ance policies have made courts struggle to find some method of reaching a sensible resolution

March 2006)
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Courts try to improve the language of insurance policies, as a parent
tries to improve a child's behavior, both by punishment and by encourage
ment. The frustration of courts in this endeavor suggests that they realize
their efforts are being wasted. As stated by one court in 1970, and repeated
by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1997:
Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite tools of the in
surance trade in drafting policies. Most are a virtually impenetrable thicket
of incomprehensible verbosity. It seems that insurers generally are attempt
ing to convince the customer when selling the policy that everything is
covered and convince the court when a claim is made that nothing is cov
5

ered.

Given how rarely insurance policy language is read, even by sophisti
cated commercial policyholders, who mostly rely on a broker's description,
it seems unlikely that policy language is meant to convince would-be poli
cyholders of broad coverage. In fact, one would expect that an attempt to
lure in new policyholders with truly incomprehensible language would fail.
Evidence supports the proposition advanced here, that the insurers' audience
from start to finish is the courts, a practice that leaves policyholders by the
wayside, and one that courts unwittingly encourage.
The first perverse incentive is one courts cannot control, but it underlies
the other three: the sheer act of having interpreted a clause in a way that
allows for predictable application in the future adds value to that clause.
With insurance, the value is great enough that this generally makes it more
likely, not less, that drafters will retain poor l anguage. With ordinary com
mercial contracts, the value of certainty will sometimes outweigh a less than
ideal clause content, and sometimes not. But where drafters-such as insur
ers--care more that a clause have a

fixed meaning than a

particular

meaning, path dependence can preclude otherwise desirable improvements
in the language.
Second, many courts have come to conclude that nondrafters cannot be
required to read their contracts. If insurance language is unredeemable, for
example, courts should simply protect the "reasonable expectations" of poli
cyholders as to the scope of their coverage--confusing contrary policy

within the conceptual bounds of treating standardized, formal contracts as if they were tradi
tional "agreements," reached by bargaining between the parties. This difficult task is often
accomplished by the use of various constructs which enable courts to reach a desired result by
giving lip service to traditional contract rules. One of the most prominent of these methods is
the well recognized principle of resolving ambiguities against the insurer [otherwise known as
contra proferentem].
Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1984) (en
bane).
5.
S.C. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 489 S.E.2d 200, 206 (S.C. 1997)
(citing Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 45 l S.W.2d 616, 622-23 (Ky. Ct. App.
1970)) (attempting to navigate the application of other insurance clauses in order to determine how
much is owed by each insurer). The South Carolina court also notes that while courts tum "confi
dently to tried and true principles of contract law," they tum in vain, for judges have "failed utterly
to anticipate the linguistic excesses to which the insurance industry would resort in order to avoid
paying claims." Id. at 2 10- 1 1.
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6
language notwithstanding. The carrot of the "reasonable expectations" doc
trine is that if insurers write clearly, the policyholder's contrary expectations
will not be considered "reasonable." The message sent by courts is a mixed
one, however. A state supreme court, for example, dismissed evidence of
clearly contrary policy language due to the absence of proof that the policy
7
holder had knowledge of the language. In other words, if the insurer could
not prove the policyholder had read the language, the language could not
control the policyholder. As more courts flirt with this approach in the ordi
nary contract realm, its potential effect deepens.
Third, courts are trapping themselves in a sticky combination of contra
proferentem, a consensus approach to finding ambiguity, and what will be

called here the adverse possession of language. Contra proferentem is meant
to give drafters an incentive to draft cleanly, by construing ambiguous lan
guage against the drafter, in favor of coverage. In first determining whether
the language is ambiguous, "some courts hold that a difference of opinion
among courts of various j urisdictions establishes conclusively that a particu
lar clause is ambiguous, while others hold that it merely constitutes
8
evidence of ambiguity." These latter courts view a split among other j uris
dictions as "a factor to be considered in determining the existence of
9
ambiguity." As more courts adopt this approach of follow the leader, na
tional drafters can more easily anticipate how the language will be
interpreted, even in j urisdictions where the clause has not yet been litigated.
1
The value of the clause thus goes up, not down. 0

6.

ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW§ 6.3 ( 1 988).

7.

C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 1 69, 1 76 (Iowa 1 975) (en bane).

8. Hartford Accident. & lndem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 295 (Ind. App. 1 997)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) ("We conclude that the division of authority on this issue is
instructive and is evidence that more than one reasonable interpretation . . . is possible."). This con
cept was confirmed in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Summit Corp. of America, 7 1 5 N.E.2d 926, 938
(Ind. App. 1 999) and American Home Assurance Co. v. A llen, 8 1 4 N.E.2d 662, 668 n.4 (Ind. App.
2004), in which the court noted: "Even if we were to find that the terms 'related' and 'interrelated'
had the same meaning, we observe that division of authority on an issue is instructive and is evi
dence that more than one reasonable interpretation of a term is possible." Id. (emphasis added); see
also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1 984) (en
bane).
9. Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 6 1 7, 624 (Md. 1 995) ("[I]f other judges have held
alternative interpretations of the same language to be reasonable, that certainly lends some credence
to the proposition that the language is ambiguous and must be resolved against the drafter."); see
also Lefrak Org., Inc. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 949, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1 996) ("[T]he
range and variety of judicial opinions bolsters the conclusion that the pollution exclusion . . . is
ambiguous."), quoted approvingly by Peace v. Nw. Nat'! Ins. Co., 596 N.W. 2d 429, 454 (Wis. 1 999);
Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1 426, 1 433 (D. Colo.
1 996) ("That different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of similar clauses in other
policies is indicative of the Policy's ambiguity."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. DeBruicker, 838 F. Supp.
2 1 5, 22 1 (E.D. Pa. 1 993) ("The fact that courts differ on the meaning of a particular term in a par
ticular context is evidence that the term is indeed ambiguous.").
1 0. As always, this is not true for clauses where the adverse interpretation is one the insurer
cannot bear actuarially. For one such example, the insurance industry's response to the risk of terror
ism coverage, see Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance,
93 GEO. L.J. 783 (2005).
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The problem is compounded by the more than legitimate position courts
take when organizations, including insurers, continue to use language that
causes years of confusion and costly litigation; at some point the "hostile,
open, and notorious" use of such difficult language causes it to be "ad
11
versely possessed" by the courts. In short, the user is on notice that courts
will construe the language against him. Even those jurisdictions that have
not yet ruled on the language, and so do not independently find the language
ambiguous, will join other courts in construing the language in favor of the
nondrafter. The result, yet again, is that the language has a settled mean
ing-not necessarily found in a natural reading of the clause-that is
2

retained, just where the evidence demands redrafting.1

This Article first examines how the drafting process creates a feedback
loop that makes existing language more valuable over time. The network
effects and path dependency of shared language are more forceful in insur
ance than ordinary contract drafting, yet this Article is the first contribution
to the subject. Next, the bulk of the Article establishes and analyzes three
ways in which courts counterintuitively reinforce the retention of unclear
language through the application of interpretative principles. Finally, while
the discussion of these perverse incentives is novel, the Conclusion consid
ers some rather obvious solutions.
I. THE BIRTH OF BOILERPLATE
The infiltration of lawyers in commercial contract drafting, at least in
the United States, has led to more than language recycled by a single entity,
it has led to communal boilerplate-fixed language that is common to an
industry, or across industries.13 The more widely boilerplate spreads, the
more it comes to resemble a public statute instead of a private agreement.
This, in tum, leads to the common law of common boilerplate.
Corbin drew a distinction between the interpretation and the construc
14
tion of contracts. An interpretation of contractual language seeks to find
the parties' meaning. A construction of the language determines the legally
binding meaning, which could bear a number of different relations to the

1 1 . BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004) ("adverse possession"); see also 2 C.J.S.
Adverse Possession § 29 (2003). The analogy is inverted because it is the drafter openly and notori
ously using the language, but the courts that come to claim possession of it. Purists can base the
adverse possession claim in the courts' hostile, open, and notorious interpretation of the language.
1 2. There is a fifth twist, not examined here, that distorts insurance drafting. In a parallel to
statutory interpretation, courts tum on occasion to the drafting and regulatory history of insurance
clauses. This history includes internal ISO documents, published bulletins, and representations to
state insurance commissioners about the scope and meaning of new clauses. This history is only
used if it adds to or changes a court's interpretation, that is, only if it provides meaning not readily
accessible in the clause itself. The private conversation between courts and insurers continues.
1 3. Farnsworth defines "boilerplate" as "standard clauses lifted from other agreements on
file or in form books." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 7. 1 , at 426 (3d ed. 1 999).
1 4. See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 534 ( 1 960); see also Arthur L.
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 740-4 1 ( 1 9 1 9).
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interpretation. With boilerplate, there is very little, if any, interpretation; all
that is left to the court is construction.
Construing boilerplate rather than interpreting it is sensible. First, given
that only one party-the drafter-may have read the language before sign
ing, or even before litigation, a court is unlikely to find an actual joint
meaning. Second, boilerplate clauses seem to make up a disproportionate
percentage of those clauses courts are unwilling to enforce, even if, or per
haps because, their meaning is clear. This is of course one of the main paths
by which construction will diverge from interpretation. Third, similar or
identical boilerplate language may have already been interpreted by the
court at hand or by other courts. In other words, the legal meaning of boiler
plate-its construction-may already be known, making any foray into its
subjective interpretation less desirable.
Moreover, the accumulative process by which boilerplate comes to be
boilerplate, discussed in detail below, often leads to language a layman will
not understand. At this point, many courts will lose all interest in the project
of interpretation, if defined as seeking the meaning the parties ascribe to the
language. And who can blame them? The nondrafter either will have as
cribed no meaning to the inchoate language or will have been misled or
confused by it. Given that a court cannot simply refuse to address the case in
the absence of meaningful interpretation, it is left with construction.
Once it is accepted that boilerplate is not necessarily the will of the par
ties, interpretation can be given up in exchange for other values. Contra
15
proferentem attempts to value fairness and future clarity, and, in the insur
ance context, the "reasonable expectations" of the policyholder. It has
therefore been written of contra proferentem that while "it can scarcely be
said to be designed to ascertain the meanings attached by the parties," at

least the "rule may encourage care in the drafting of contracts."16 This Arti
cle suggests otherwise.

The value of uniform interpretation for the same clause across parties
mimics the application of statutory law. Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 2 11(2), "standardized agreements" are "interpreted wherever
reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to
7

their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing."1

This rule "subordinates the meaning that an individual party may have at
tached to the contract language to the goal of equality of treatment for
parties that are similarly situated."18 In other words, the language is treated

1 5.
Contra proferentem as a concept comes first from noninsurance contract law and is de
scribed in varying ways. The Supreme Court, applying it in a construction case, referred to "the
general maxim that a contract should be construed most strongly against the drafter." United States
v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 2 1 0 ( 1 970). As early as 1923, the Court had applied the rule in the in
surance context. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 1 67, 1 74 ( 1 923) ("The
rule is settled that in case of ambiguity that construction of the policy will be adopted which is most
favorable to the insured."); see also infra note 64.
1 6.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 1 3, § 7. 1 1 , at 474.

1 7.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 1 1 (2) ( 1 98 1 ).

1 8.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 1 3, § 7. 1 1 , at 474.
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not as a private agreement, but as a public statute, with one meaning applied
19
to all.
This approach to the unfortunate aspects of boilerplate can be self
perpetuating. Boilerplate that has repeatedly been construed by courts will
take on a set, common meaning, but one that may not be easily understood
2°
by reading the language itself. As with judicial interpretation of broad stat
utes ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
21
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."), or constitutional provi
sions

("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
22
speech."), the meaning ascribed to the language by an innocent first reader
will differ markedly from the meaning the language is given in court, the
23
meaning upon which drafters rely. With contract clauses, as with such stat
utes, an outside reader may have an illusion of understanding, but only
knowledge of the subsequent case law and regulatory actions can reveal
what the language means in the eyes of the law.
For the first nondrafter or consumer before the court, the application of
contra proferentem is a boon, assuming that the drafter's interpretation was

rejected by the court in part to protect the consumer. But if the court's con
struction of the language is acceptable to the drafter, it will be used in the
future, to the disadvantage of consumers two through two million, who will
not understand the language or who will be misled by it into not seeking
relief a court would grant. In short, the language takes on a private meaning,
not between the two parties to the contract, but between the courts and the
sophisticated drafter.
Of all contracts, the insurance policy is the poster child for the down
sides of boilerplate. Yet the doctrine and interpretive approaches applied to
insurance are more strict or more consistently applied versions of those ap
plied to other contracts. The assumption has been that courts are stricter
with insurance contracts because insurers are incorrigibly bad drafters. It is
worth asking if there is not some reverse causation; insurers have become
the drafters they are under this stricter interpretive regime.

1 9. See, e. g., Carroll v. Littleford, 1 70 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Ga. 1 966) ("[T]he construction
placed . . . upon similar contracts will control.").
20. Boilerplate language that has a meaning apparent to drafter and nondrafter alike, and that
a court is willing to enforce, does not concern us here.
21.

E.g. , Sherman Act, 1 5 U.S.C. §

22.

E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I.

l

(2000).

23. Drafters do not have to be in litigation to rely on the courts' interpretation, of course. The
initial payment offer and later negotiating positions are based on the actor's perception of what
would happen if the parties were to litigate.
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II. THE FEEDBACK LOOP JN POLICY DRAFTING
Positive network effects can flow from common or boilerplate clauses in
24
Widespread, shared contract language is more likely to have
25
taken on a lay meaning, and to have been previously interpreted, perhaps
26
definitively, by courts. If courts have fleshed out the application of lan

any contract.

guage, a drafter can be confident about its future application. The value of
contract language can therefore increase as the number of others adopting
the language increases.

27
Interestingly, this is not a "true" or traditional network effect. The

value of a network effect in contract language may be one that, once
achieved, is permanent, and no longer rests on the number of other users. By
contrast, in order for the phone line running into your house to be valuable,
there must be others on the network; the fact that others were once on the
network is of less use than an eight-track player. Moreover, in this tradi
tional network effect, the value of the network increases with the addition of
each new member, assuming the absence of network overload. The added
value of a network of contracts with the same clause may increase with each
new member, but only up to a certain point, after which additional members
28
neither add nor detract from the value.
This imprecise fit between true network effects and the synergy or ge
29
stalt effects
of widespread contract language may explain the limited
0
network analysis in the contract literature.3 It cannot explain the inattention
in the insurance context, however, where both true network and gestalt ef
fects are strong. The combined strength of the effects is more than additive,
it is mutually reinforcing.

24. This point is not new, of course.See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"'), 83 VA. L.REV. 7 1 3
( 1 997); Michael Klausner, Corporations. Corporate Law. and Networks of Contracts, 8 1 VA. L.
REV. 757 ( 1 995). The near absence of a discussion of network effects in the insurance contract is
startling, however.One of the best early articles about network effects in the law does at least briefly
mention insurance. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV.479, 587 ( 1 998).
25. The lay meaning may not conform to the meaning given by courts, of course, which is a
severe problem addressed below.
26. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychologi
cal Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 5 1 VAND.L. REV. 1 583, 1 594-95 ( 1 998).
27. See generally Lemley & McGowan, supra note 24; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Mar
golis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1 994, at 1 33, 1 35;
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 79, I IO (200 1 ); Howard A. Shelanski & 1. Gregory Sidak, A ntitrust Divestiture in
Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 , 5 (200 1).
28. With traditional network effects, the counterpart. to this point is sometimes referred to as
critical mass: the point at which the value of joining the network exceeds the cost because of the
positive externalities generated by those already on the network.
29.

These effects are "gestalt" in the sense that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

30. For an excellent exception, see Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts A re Written in "Legalese",
77 CHI.-KENT L.REV.59 (200 1 ).
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A brief primer on insurance drafting: The primary organization in charge
31
ISO copy

of the drafting process is the Insurance Services Office, or IS0.

rights standard policy forms and sells access to them. In addition to drafting,
ISO submits proposed language to state insurance commissioners and works
with the commissioners, sometimes collectively, until the language is ap
32
proved for use. As loss data on the language comes back, and as courts
33
interpret the language, ISO may start the cycle again with redrafting. The
result, says ISO, is that consumers "benefit from the clarity that the standard
34

coverage language achieves."

It should be questioned both whether language does indeed evolve from
less to more clear and who benefits from the language changes that are
made. ISO boasts that it "monitors changes in the insurance industry and in
the law," and then "drafts language necessary to address new laws, court
35
interpretations of coverage forms, or changed market conditions." But re
drafts often carry the baggage of their past with them, so that for the
cognoscenti, the language has contextualized meaning. This richer meaning

is a form of greater clarity for courts and for insurers, but not necessarily for
policyholders.
Courts and academics are overlooking the fundamental ways in which
insurance drafting differs from ordinary contract drafting, even sophisticated
commercial drafting. The structure of collective drafting and data pooling
creates network effects and path dependence. The system is inherently self
reinforcing, but the strength of the reinforcement depends on the value of
known language relative to the value of redrafted language. Doctrines of

3 1 . ISO formed in 1 9 7 1 through the merger of similar entities for stock insurance companies
(the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, later the Insurance Rating Bureau) and mutual in
surance companies (the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau), both of which had been drafting policy
language for the entire industry since the early 1 940s. ISO bills itself as "the property/casualty in
surance industry's leading supplier of statistical, actuarial, underwriting, and claims data." ISO
Home Page, http://www.iso.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). ISO should not be confused with ISO,
the International Organization for Standardization. See Int'! Org. for Standardization Home Page,
http://www.iso.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
32.

The role of insurance commissioners is significant:

States have the principal regulatory authority over the primary insurance companies [and e]ach
state has an insurance official who has two primary areas of responsibility: (I) monitoring and
overseeing the financial solvency of the insurers, and (2) examining insurers' rates and market
practices. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), through its advisory
recommendations, plays a key role in state regulators' efforts to coordinate and strengthen
their oversight of the insurance industry.
PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 1 998) (citation omitted).
33. Standardized policies do include "manuscript" terms, terms that are drafted for a particu
lar policy. Even here, however, any given manuscript term is likely based on a common form of that
term. The existence of a manuscript term may indicate more individualized bargaining over that
particular term, such that negotiation history might prove useful, but it does not necessarily make
interpretation of the term any less "public" than standard ISO terms.
34. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., ISO: ENHANCING COMPETITION IN THE WORLD'S INSURANCE
MARKETS ( 1 999), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 33 (3d
ed. 2000).
35.

ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 34.
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interpretation that increase the value of known language or increase the risk
of new language strengthen the loop.
In the ordinary contract setting, Kahan and Klausner reserve the term
"network benefits" for those externalities that are dependent upon an exist
ing network but not a past network, and use "learning benefits" for those
externalities that are dependent upon the past common use but not a future
36
one. Learning benefits in ordinary contracts can stem from language that
has become familiar through use, whether or not the language continues to
37
Just so in insurance, but the learning carries more weight in

be popular.
two ways.

First, whether wisdom or paranoia, insurers assume that new language
will be systematically construed against their interests. The value of "learn
ing," therefore, is higher relative to the dim alternative for insurers. Second,
insurers are learning on two fronts. In addition to the language taking on a
shared industry meaning, it takes on judicial meaning, and then actuarial
meaning.
Note that the network value of judicial knowledge is separate from that
of actuarial knowledge. There is a value to many insurers being on the same
"language network," in that the language will more quickly be interpreted
by each jurisdiction, and without most insurers having to engage in litiga
tion. As with statutes, but unlike many contracts, a court's interpretation of
policy language holds for all those "governed" by the language. "The inter
pretation of policy terms is generalized beyond the claims of a single
38
insured to the entire market for that policy." This is a direct network effect
until the terms are well settled, and then it becomes a learning benefit, in
that others do not need to continue using the language going forward.
The value of actuarial data, by contrast, includes an ongoing network ef
fect, which would be lost if others dropped off the chain. The size, scope,
and frequency of losses change over time; without the ability to continually
pool loss data with others hooked into the same network, past actuarial data
loses its value. Insurers find themselves locked into existing language be
cause they must stay in the feedback loop to retain that value. Without the
collective endeavor, the rating services (i.e., price setting) of ISO become
useless.
Of course, the collective gain from pooling loss data can be had with
new language. The value of new language is enhanced by the network bene
fit of collecting

actuarial

data, even if the learning benefit of court

interpretation has yet to be reached. However, until the language has been
interpreted, the actuarial data will have limited value; the question is not
simply how many fires there are in a year, for example, but how many are

36.

Kahan & Klausner, supra note 24, at 7 1 8.

37.
Of course, there may be some level of "maintenance" use that is required to sustain the
learning benefit.
38. John Randolph Prince, Ill, Where No Minds Meet: Insurance Policy Interpretation and
the Use of Drafting History, 1 8 VT. L. REv. 409, 4 1 3 ( 1 994).
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covered and to what amount-information that comes only from the interac
39
tion of fire facts with courts' interpretation of fire language.
As a result, insurers will retain language that is unclear to policyholders
as long as it has become clear to courts, even if the courts' interpretation
differs from the insurer's original meaning. For example, consider a policy
that covers a policyholder's "property damage," defined as "physical injury
to tangible property . . . or loss of use of tangible property that is not physi

cally inj ured." 40 When the policyholder's computers crash, destroying
valuable electronic data, is there coverage?41 Courts are currently struggling
with whether electronically stored data is tangible property and whether the
42
loss of data is property damage.
Although large sums of money are at stake in the initial decisions, pro
spectively the answer doesn't much matter. Either computer files are
property, in which case insurers can include the risk in the premium, or files
aren' t property, in which case insurers will exclude the risk from the pre
mium.

Similarly,

although

with more difficulty,

if electronic data is

"tangible property" according to case law, insurers can rewrite the definition
of "property" or explicitly exclude electronic data from coverage, perhaps
selling separate electronic coverage. Once the language has been given
meaning by the courts, even if it continues to confuse policyholders, the
insurer's path is set.
It should be noted that although insurers may be indifferent, something
is lost when restricted coverage is interpreted more expansively. In extreme

cases, insurers will find the expanded coverage untenable and drop the area
of coverage altogether. Policyholders might prefer a world in which they can
choose between buying ordinary property coverage, or, for more money,
adding electronic property coverage. If, on the other hand, policyholders
always assume that electronic data will be covered, courts may be right that
these expectations can be met only by preventing insurers from selling the
lesser coverage.

39. On the other hand, it might be that insurers experience a strong learning benefit from
judicial and actuarial experience, but not the usual benefit of a shared understanding between the
contracting parties themselves. If this Article is correct that insurers either choose or are trained to
ignore the policyholder when drafting, then shared understanding between the two contracting par
ties is unlikely and insignificant.
40. Catherine L. Rivard & Michael A. Rossi, Expert Commentary: ls Computer Data "Tan
gible Property" or Subject to "Physical Loss or Damage"?-Part 1, INT'L RISK MGMT INST., Aug.
200 I, http://www.irrni.com/irrnicorn/expert/articles/200 l /rossi08.aspx (describing the standard
Commercial General Liability policy definition of "property damage").
4 1 . For a thorough analysis of the options under different policies and clauses, see Robert H.
Jerry, II & Michele L. Mekel, Cybercoverage for Cyber-Risks: An Overview of Insurers' Responses
to the Perils of £-Commerce, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 7 (2001).
42. For two of the best opinions on each side, compare Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2003) (under Virginia law, computer data not covered because not
tangible property), with Centennial Ins. Co. v. Applied Health Care Sys., Inc., 7 10 F.2d 1 288 (7th
Cir. 1 983) (under California law, insurer had a duty to defend a computer hardware and software
policyholder for loss of computer data).
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With or without this loss of choice, there are thus several types of path
43
Once the meaning

dependence to the interpretation of a boilerplate clause.

of a clause has been clarified, enlarged, and applied by a court, its value in
creases, at least for the drafter. The drafter can communicate, to courts, if
44
in one clause what it has taken a court paragraphs

not to policyholders,

or perhaps an entire opinion-to say. Goetz and Scott have described this, in
the ordinary contract context, as the "quasi-Darwinian evolutionary process"
that clauses must undergo in order to "become mature conventions whose
, 45
risks and performance characteristics are known.'
O f course, knowing precisely how courts will interpret a clause can
regularly lead to rejecting it. On the other hand, the replacement for a
dropped clause might not be a newly minted one, but an alteration to the
original. The alteration may be crafted in direct response to court opinions,
again leaving the nondrafter out of the loop.
This type of "increasing returns" path dependence has not been applied
to the insurance context, where it has real purchase; the force of path de
pendence cuts deeper ruts with insurance than ordinary contracts because of
the feedback loop of actuarial data. Not only does past language become
clearer over time in the i nsurer's eyes, but the cost of each clause becomes
increasingly clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled. Changing lan
46

guage, even in an effort to decrease coverage, could be more costly.

Insurance drafting thus creates more than a set path: it creates a Mobius
strip of language reinforcement. Insurers can check out anytime they like,
47

but they can never leave.

As traditional path dependence teaches, the cost of shifting paths once
the journey has begun may be prohibitive unless the value of the alternative
path is higher than the collective switching cost. Insurers may be engaging

43. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Chan ge in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REV. 601 (2001).
44.
These differences are analogical to private and state-supplied contractual terms. See
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 ( 1 985).
45.

Id. at 278. According to Goetz and Scott:

A ... critically important benefit of standardized formulations is the reliability that results
from the process of 'recognition.' A term is recognized when it is identified through adjudica
tion or statutory interpretation and blessed with an official meaning. Informal or 'unofficial'
customary term5 may be well-tested and clearly communicative between parties to the transac
tion and nonetheless be subject to the prospect of misinterpretation by the state.
Id. at 288.
46.
Even if insurers could write so clearly that policyholders and insurers had a shared un
derstanding of the language, an omniscient court could not remove the risk of interpreting the
language in new, unexpected contexts. New circumstances arise that neither party anticipated but
that existing policy language might cover. No amount of careful drafting can answer these questions
in advance, although redrafting as facts gradually change could. For example, why did insurers not
write language anticipating the loss of computer data by the 1 980s, if not much earlier? This Article
provides a partial answer.
47.
With apologies to THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Elek
tra/Asylum Records 1976).
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Even without such

bias, it would be accurate for insurers to realize that there are large costs
incurred in organizing the industry through groups like ISO, reaching
agreement on new language, implementing the language in future policies,
and educating policyholders about the change. Abandoning the value of a
known interpretation should be added to these costs.
III. PERVERSE I NCENTIVES
The pitfalls of communal drafting are most dramatic with insurance
specific examples, although much of the analysis holds true in a less striking
form for all boilerplate. Courts seemingly fail to see how their directives
interact with the structure of the insurance-drafting process in particular and
the choice of boilerplate in general. As a result, courts either fail to see the
weakness of interpretive incentives, or they actively provide incentives to
retain murky language. Three of these missteps are identified and explored
here.
A. An Interpreted Clause ls a Good Clause
As the path-dependency discussion reveals, an interpreted clause is a
valuable, predictable clause. With a settled contract term in the hand, even
well-drafted new language is in the bush, because "the change itself weak
ens the relevance of the existing stock of dispute-resolving conventions that
49
the traditional language invoked." Ordinary contract drafters thus become
attached to clauses that both parties can agree upon and that consistently
convey the intended meaning to the court.
With insurance, however, every settled clause has value.

5°

First, a clause

that confuses or misleads policyholders can still serve an insurer's purpose
if courts understand it. This is possible because a side effect of collective
drafting is the lack of competition on policy language. As a former president
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC, testi
51
standard clauses are

fied,

very carefully drawn by the best people in the industry and widely dis
seminated and understood and expected and desired and needed by the
insurance industry to mean the same thing regardless of who issues it, re
gardless of whom he issues it to or where the claim arises or what the

48. See Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (2005).
49.

Goetz & Scott, supra note 44, at 30 1 .

50. Well, almost every clause has value; those that require an insurer to provide coverage for
a risk it deems uninsurable will be removed from future policies. A war exclusion that removed from
coverage the losses of war, for example, would be changed or removed if courts consistently read it
to require terrorism coverage. See Boardman, supra note 1 0.
5 1 . The NAIC is first and foremost the national group for the state insurance commission
ers-the people responsible for regulating insurance in each state. Its connections with the industry
are both incestuous and adversarial.
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The language means

the same thing.

If the language is the same, and is given the same meaning for all com
ers by courts, there may be competition about which clauses are in each
policy but not about the wording of those clauses. As a result, insurers don't
have to compete by making clauses more accessible to policyholders-but
only so long as all insurers use the same clause.
The industry's position is that, "[w]ith most insurers offering policies
based on standard ISO language, insurance consumers can readily compare
their options, based on price, coverage, service. By contrast, if standardized
coverages did not exist, consumers would face an unintelligible array of
53
different insurance forms." This proposition needs to be tested empirically.
In lines such as life insurance, insurers do not need to pool loss data because
the data is straightforward and available without collaboration. Clauses and
policies still tend to converge on similar language, and perhaps it is easier
for policyholders to compare both price and substance where one basic risk
54
is insured.
Whether insurers are right about policyholders' preferences for price
competition over substance competition, collective drafting makes some
forms of insurance possible.
If each carrier's loss experience were derived from different policy lan
guage, the statistics collected by the rating bureaus could never serve as the
basis for loss prediction and rate-setting. Similarly, if individual carriers
applied standard-form language differently, their loss experience data
55
would be useless to the rating bureaus.

At the heart of this ability to pool individual insurer's data is the courts'
willingness to grant standard policy language the universal power of a stat
ute.
A final way in which insurance drafting calcifies around a court's inter
pretation, any interpretation, is the insurers' willingness to accept an adverse
interpretation, changing premiums in lieu of changing the language. This is
unlikely to be the case in ordinary contract drafting; if a term is consistently
misinterpreted by courts, drafters will stop using the clause. But as with
"property damage" to "electronic data," insurers may prefer a court's known
interpretation to the insurer's original intended meaning.
Given network effects, path dependence taking the actuarial loop, and
the customary preference of insurers for certainty over substance, what's a

52.
In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Case, Jud. Council Coord. Proceeding No. 1072 (Cal. Su
per.) (testimony of Richard E. Stewart, referring to Commercial General Liability policies),
reprinted in John E. Heintz & Adrienne Danforth, Construing Standard Policy Language for the
"Sophisticated Insured", 516 PLl/LIT 3 1 1 , 317 ( 1 994) (emphasis added).
53.

ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 33.

In addition to insuring against the risk that an income-earner will die young, life insur
54.
ance policies commonly include an investment component. Investment options differ more widely
but still allow for competition on both price and substance.
55.

Heintz & Danforth, supra note 52, at 3 1 8.
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court to do? Unlike the next two contributions to calcified language, courts
may be innocent parties in this debacle. The industry places great value,
efficiently and not, on language that has been reliably interpreted by courts.
The two obvious "fixes" are for courts to begin interpreting erratically or to
refuse to interpret deficient language at all. Neither is tenable. Next best,
understanding the self-reinforcing nature of insurance drafting might help
relieve courts of the resentment that insurers willfully ignore their direc
tives; in fact, insurers seem to deaf to all others.
B. Drafters Will Write Only to Those Who Read
The reasonable expectations doctrine belittles the role of the written
contract, thereby encouraging drafters to ignore it. In some courts, the focus
on reasonable expectations began as a limitation on the power of contra pro
56
If a term were ambiguous--open to more than one reasonable

ferentem.

interpretation---c ourts would follow the proconsumer interpretation, but
only if the result were within the consumer's reasonable expectation of the
clause. In a strong minority of jurisdictions, this has been inverted in the
insurance context;

the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, as

formed by life, can trump what would be a reasonable expectation formed
from the policy language.
One given purpose of the reasonable expectations doctrine is to create
57
"incentives for insurers to clarify language." If only the language could be
made clear enough, the contrary expectations of a policyholder would be
deemed unreasonable. But in some jurisdictions the doctrine "applies to all
insurance contracts" because "insurance policies are weighted with such a
prolixity of complex verbiage that they would not be understood" and, if read,
would present "an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confu
5
sion." 8 Here, the incentive fails because of the unrebuttable presumption

56.
The doctrine was first fully crafted by Robert E. Keeton in his seminal article, Robert E.
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 9 6 1 ( 1 970).
Keeton recognized an existing judicial behavior and molded it into a single coherent theory, but the
behavior he observed was not uniform at the time and has not become uniform since . Twenty six
years later, there are too many articles addressing the doctrine in the insurance context to cite. See
Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1 1 5 1 (198 1 ); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 5 1 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 ( 1 990); Peter
Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Ex
pectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000); and the Fall 1 998 issue of the Connecticut Insurance
Law Journal.
57.
John L. Romaker & Virgil B. Prieto, Expectations Lost: Bank of the West v. Superior
Court Places the Fox in Charge of the Henhouse, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 83, 1 03 ( 1 992) (citing Keeton,
supra note 56, at 968).
58.
Storms v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 579-80 (N.H. 1978) (quoting De Lancey
v. Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 58 1 , 588 ( 1 873)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Indeed, the court seems
to think insurance scholars are engaged in a form of extreme scholarship. In its view, because insur
ers are afraid:

that, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, some extremely eccentric person
might attempt to examine and understand the meaning of the involved and intricate net in
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that insurance language is unreadable; once the application of the doctrine is
divorced entirely from the policy language, the insurer has no incentive to
make it clear, as no level of clarity would help.
For courts that take this position, the "duty to read" either does not arise
59
This is so for one or several reasons: the policyholder
60
does not receive the actual language until after the policy has been issued;
or is a weak one.

the insurer knows the policyholder does not read the policy when he re
6
ceives it and therefore cannot rely on his having read it; 1 or the policyholder
could not, or does not, understand the language in those rare cases where it
is read. In this last case, courts are unwilling to charge policyholders with a
"duty to understand" the policy because it is not their fault that the policy is
incomprehensible, and if there is no duty to understand the written words, it
would be silly to enforce a duty to read.
In its more extreme form, the doctrine allows courts to refuse to enforce
policy language that is out of keeping with the policyholder's "reasonable
expectations" of what the policy would cover, even if reading the policy
would be sufficient to disabuse the policyholder of his expectation. As one
state supreme court explained, "[i]f a policy is so constructed that a reason
able man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it, the
insured's reasonable expectations will not be delimited by the policy lan
guage, regardless of the clarity of one particular phrase among the Augean
62
stable of print." In this scenario, insurers will aim to make policy language
clear to the judge who will interpret it, not to the policyholder who is ex
63
cused from reading it.

which he was to be entangled, it was printed in such small type, and in lines so long and
crowded, that the perusal of it was made physically difficult, painful, and injurious.
Id. at 580 (quoting De Lancey, 52 N.H. at 588).

59. C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 1 69, 1 76 (Iowa 1 975) (en bane)
("Nor can it be asserted the above doctrine [the reasonable expectations rule] does not apply here
because plaintiff knew the policy contained the provision now complained of and [the plaintiff]
cannot be heard to say it reasonably expected what it knew was not there. A search of the record
discloses no such knowledge.").
60. The policyholder commonly has a right to reject the contract for a brief period after
receiving the policy.
6 1 . See, e.g., Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 6 1 2 S.W.2d 4 1 3 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1 98 1 ). "In a contract of adhesion," including the insurance policy under discussion, "the terms
are imposed by the proponent of the form: they are not expected to be read and even if read, the
adherent has choice only to conform." Id. at 4 1 9 (citing CORBIN, supra note 14, § 559); see also 7
SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 906B (3d
ed. 1 963).
62. Storms, 388 A.2d at 580 (emphasis added) (finding that no policyholder could have a
reasonable expectation of coverage after a policy had lapsed); cf Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v.
City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 270-72 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (applying New Hampshire law).
63. In such cases, the courts seem concerned only with the representations of the insurer. But
the policyholder makes representations too: that he understands the nature of the coverage being
purchased. If the policyholder's expectations are wildly out of sync with the actuarial underpinnings
of what the policy will pay out and what the policy must first take in by premium, perhaps the poli
cyholder should be estopped from insisting on his view of coverage. Should IBM, for example, not
be charged with having read its policy?
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C. Contra Proferentem: Ambiguity by Consensus
and the Adverse Possession of Language

The doctrine of contra proferentem has an appealing principal ration
64
As the party in control of the drafting process, "it is incumbent upon
65
the dominant party to make terms clear." If the drafter fails in its charge,
ambiguous language will be construed against the drafter, in keeping with
66
the reader's reasonable expectations. This provides the drafter an incentive
ale.

to improve the language and is only fair to the reader, who cannot affect
standard-form language. In short, from power comes responsibility: "Con
voluted or confusing terms are the problem of the insurer . . . not the insured
,, 67
Nicely turned out, but not true. Today, the ambiguity problem may be
caused by the drafter, but it belongs to the consumer. The consumer is sad
dled with the same confusing language time and again, despite the drafter's
court-appointed duty. Courts-seemingly unaware of the private nature of
their conversation with drafters, insurers in particular-are at wits' end. The
Third Circuit was recently exasperated by a clause that "is widely used i n
insurance policies and has been the subject o f heated litigation throughout
68
the entire country over the past thirty years." The relevant clause reads:
" ' Personal inj ury' means injury, other than 'bodily injury,' arising out of . . .
In some jurisdictions, courts have decided that in order to maintain a uniform interpretation of
identical policy language, the interpretation for sophisticated policyholders must match that for
unsophisticated ones. Therefore, if an unsophisticated policyholder appears before a court first, the
language in that jurisdiction will, for all, be based on the nonreading reasonable expectations. It
would seem that insurers have an incentive to take their sophisticated policyholders to court first, in
order to lock in a language-based interpretation, and exclude an expectations-based interpretation.
64. Contra proferentem is a basic contract law principle, described in varying ways. See, e.g.,
1 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 32: 1 2 , at
476-8 1 (4th ed. 1 993 & Supp. 2005) ("Indeed, any contract of adhesion, a contract entered without
any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior bargaining power, is particularly susceptible to
the rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON
TRACTS§ 206 ( 1 98 1 ) ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a
term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the
words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."); UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 4.6 ( 1 994) ("If contract terms supplied by one party are unclear, an
interpretation against that party is preferred."); see also 1 7A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 342 (2004)
("An instrument uncertain as to its terms is to be most strongly construed against the party thereto
who causes such uncertainty to exist, especially if he or she is the party who drew the contract or
selected its language."). C.J.S. expands on the case of selecting language drafted by a third party:
The language of a contract will be construed most strictly or strongly against the party respon
sible for its use, whether that party or his or her representative chose the language or prepared
the contract. A party is responsible for language used by his or her attorney in drafting a con
tract [as well].
1 7A C.J.S. Contracts § 337 (2003).
65.

Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1 1 46, 1 150 (Del. 1 997).

66. In insurance, the role of the policyholder's reasonable expectations varies with the juris
diction. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 07 ( 1 998).
67.

Penn Mut. Life, 695 A.2d at 1 1 50.

68. New Castle County, Del. v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 243 F.3d 744,
747 (3d Cir. 200 I) (emphasis added).
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[t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of
private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by
69
or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor."
As potential ambiguities spring to mind, bear in mind that in order to
apply contra proferentem, the language must be ambiguous "as applied" to
the factual case at hand. Here, the policyholder was a Delaware county that
had quashed the plans of a developer, who then promptly sued for the taking
70
of property without due process of law and for equal protection violations.
The county claimed that the insurer should provide coverage.
The policyholder's first winning position was that "invasion of the right
of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises" was ambiguous

enough to allow a reasonable interpretation encompassing rezoning and
building permit denial. The court's conclusion that the language was am

biguous is supportable; the conclusion that the language was ambiguous as
applied is not.

1. A mbiguous by Consensus
To support its conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on the fact that other
71
courts had found the language ambiguous. Some courts explicitly state that
insurers should be held to the interpretation most favorable to the policy
holder where there are known splits because the insurer has failed in its job
72
of rewriting language it knows causes confusion. Other courts hold more
simply that such splits are evidence of ambiguity and resolve the ambiguity
73
against the insurer.
A minority of courts has found "invasion of private right" ambiguous, a
majority has found it unambiguously excludes regulatory decisions, and
none has found it unambiguously includes regulatory decisions. From this,
the Third C ircuit, among others, concluded that the language must be am
biguous. In an earlier case, the Third C ircuit had held that "[t]he mere fact
that several . . . courts have ruled in favor of a construction denying cover
age, and several others have reached directly contrary conclusions, viewing

69.

Id. at 756--5 7 n. I (Scirica, J., dissenting) (quoting insurance policy).

70.

Id. at 747-48.

71.

Id. at 754-56.

72. See 2 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1 5 :83 (2d
rev. ed. 1 984); see also Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1 987) ("[T]hat
different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of the policy is strongly indicative of the
policy's essential ambiguity."); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Summit Corp. of Am., 7 1 5 N.E.2d 926, 938
(Ind. Ct. App. 1 999) ("This disagreement among the courts further indicates the ambiguity of the
personal injury provisions."). One state supreme court has recognized that because it "follow[s] the
rule of construction that where different jurisdictions reach different conclusions regarding the lan
guage of an insurance contract 'ambiguity is established,' " it may be ''.justly criticized for accepting
the inventions [of ambiguity] of other courts." Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1 984) (en bane) (citation omitted).
73. See New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 756 ("A single phrase, which insurance companies
have consistently refused to define, and that has generated literally hundreds of lawsuits, with
widely varying results, cannot, under our application of commonsense, be termed unambiguous.").
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almost identical policy provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion
that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation,"
7
and is therefore ambiguous. 4
The perverse incentive of abdicating the ambiguity decision to other
courts is apparent. It allows the ordinarily slow process of jurisdiction-by
jurisdiction interpretation to snowball, increasing the predictive power of the
language in less time. Moreover, following other jurisdictions on the ambi
guity question might interfere with efficient competition between the
75
states. State courts do not defer to the decisions of other state courts on the
theory that, well, hell, they' ve already done the work.

Finally, this follow-the-leader approach leads to awkward results once a
jurisdiction has already ruled that particular language is not ambiguous,
only to find a later split among the jurisdictions. Most courts will not reverse
course because "conflicting interpretations from other jurisdictions do not
create ambiguity where [the] courts have adopted a definitive interpretation
7
under [that state's] law." 6 The somewhat random result is that whether a
term is considered ambiguous or not in a given jurisdiction may turn on the
order of decisions.
2. The Adverse Possession of Language
The second winning position for the "takings" policyholder was that in
surers were on notice that the language was u nacceptable. "Insurance
companies have included the clause . . . for at least twenty years, and liti
gants have repeatedly disputed the meaning of the term ' invasion of the right
77
of private occupancy.' " Moreover, after decades of litigation, while courts

74. Little, 836 F.2d at 796 (quoting Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1 98 1 ) (emphasis added) ("[T]hat different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of the
policy is strongly indicative of the policy's essential ambiguity."). The Third Circuit reaffirmed this
concept in New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 754. Since Cohen, however, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has, in turn, embraced and abandoned this approach. See, e.g. , Lower Paxton Twp. v. U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 400--0 1 n.4 (Pa.Super. Ct. 1 989). There the court noted:
role were we to decide such [ambiguity] cases by
process of searching the nation's courts to ascertain if there are conflict
ing decisions. . . . [W]hether other courts have reached varying conclusions regarding the
meaning of a policy is only relevant where the various meanings ascribed are reasonable.

Surely we would be abdicating our judicial
the purely mechanical

Id. The court then decided that the other courts "have ascribed an unreasonable meaning to an un
ambiguous provision." Id. After this 1 989 rejection of Cohen, a 1 98 1 case, a panel of the court
reverted in 1 995, see Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 1 46 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1 995) ("More important than the actual holdings by other courts is the fact that their decisions dem
onstrate the existence of an ambiguity in the crucial term . . . ."), only to again reject the practice in
1 996, see Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 802, 807 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1 996) ("Rather than relying on the fact that jurisdictions are split over construing the provisions or
that one jurisdictional line of reasoning is better than another, courts must remember to invoke the
basic tenet of contract law and look to the writing itself first, before otherwise deciding a policy is
ambiguous.").
75. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common law: A Supply-Side
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 55 1 (2003).
76.

E.g. , Beretta, U.S.A., Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 1 1 7 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (D. Md. 2000).

77.

New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 755 (quoting lower court disposition).
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have still not settled on a common meaning, insurers know that a decent
percentage will find the language ambiguous. Given this, courts take the
position that ongoing use of such open and notoriously difficult language
will be declared "adversely possessed" by the courts; its meaning may once
78

have belonged to the drafter, but now it is as the courts say.

As to why, in the face of this history, insurers had chosen not to clarify
the language, or to stop using it, the court admitted that it "cannot conceive
79
of an answer." What the court does not realize is that it has fired its last
shot, and the insurer knows it. The threat of construing language against the
insurer is mainly in the surprise; the insurer collected premium X but finds it
owes coverage X + Y. The next year the insurer collects premium X + Y, or
some calculation thereof, discounting (perhaps) for those policyholders who
8
won't seek Y coverage from X language. 0 One would think that this calcula
tion would become complicated where one-third of the states choose X,
one-third choose X + Y, and one-third has yet to rule. Courts are not the only
ones stymied that insurers retain the language despite this morass, but con
sider the insurer's options.
In two-thirds of the jurisdictions, the language has a settled valuable
meaning: X in one-third, X + Y in one-third. In the remaining one-third,
insurers can guess that more than half will take the jurisdictional split as
proof of ambiguity and find X + Y coverage. A settled meaning can there
fore be expected in five-sixths of the jurisdictions. In any event, the insurer
knows the exact application of the clause (for the disputed facts) in the great
majority of jurisdictions; why would it redraft the language now?
We might suspect that insurers would object to the untidy patchwork of
interpretations. To get uniform results, the insurer has two options. First, it
could introduce new language in every jurisdiction, but this opens it up to a
whole new round of the game, without the current interpretation-security
found in over two-thirds of cases. Second, it could introduce new language
in the X + Y jurisdictions only, aiming to return to the category of X cover
age. This choice

only makes sense if uniform coverage from varied

language is better than varied coverage from uniform language.
Of course, this analysis leaves out a central incentive for insurers-the
cost of litigation. Under the current regime, the insurer can handle claims
and settlements in at least two-thirds of cases (assuming equal distribution
of cases across jurisdictions) without much need for litigation, at least not
language-based litigation. The insurer knows how courts will interpret the
language without going to court again, and the policyholder, even if con
fused about the language beforehand, can discover its meaning after the
loss. If new language is introduced, however, even relatively clear language,

78.

See supra note 1 1 .

79.

New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 755.

80. See infra text accompanying note 87, discussing unsophisticated or ill-advised policy
holders who do not know to seek coverage because the policy language does not reveal that courts
have found coverage.
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it likely will be litigated in every jurisdiction until a settled meaning is
found. This insurers do not want to do.
Finally, some argue that contra proferentem should apply equally to un
sophisticated and sophisticated parties, in order to maintain a uniform
81
interpretation of the same policy language. As the Supreme Court of Wash
ington reasoned:
This standard form policy has been issued to big and small businesses
throughout the state. Therefore it would be incongruous for the court to
apply different rules of construction based on the policyholder because
once the court construes the standard form coverage clause as a matter of
law, the court's construction will bind policyholders throughout the state
82

regardless of the size of their business.

This seems to mean that even if a policyholder could show good reason
why it understood the language at hand to have a different meaning, and the
specific insurer either shared that meaning at the time (contrary, let us as
sume, to the drafters and the current precedent) or had reason to know of the
policyholder's understanding yet did nothing to fix it, the court should re
frain from enforcing the parties' joint intent.
This may be one of the strangest aspects of the statutory nature of boi
lerplate clauses; as with legislation, but unlike most contracts, a court's
interpretation of policy language holds for all those "governed" by the lan
guage. The industry seems to recognize the statutory nature of insurance
clause interpretation:
Court interpretations of standard coverage forms further assure consistent
treatment of claimants. Once a court determines the meaning of a word,
phrase, or clause in a standard coverage form, that interpretation has

far

more meaning and scope

than if every insurer's policy form used different
83
wording for the same idea.

What has escaped notice, and therefore scrutiny, is the fact that this ad
ditional meaning is semi-private-the result of an ongoing conversation
between insurers and courts-of which policyholders may be unaware. Of
course, the meaning is public in that judicial opinions are public, but the
public nature of Supreme Court opinions has not brought constitutional un
derstanding to the streets.

81.

See, e.g. , Heintz & Danforth, supra note 52, at 3 1 4-- 1 5.

82.
Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 5 1 4 (Wash. 1 990) (en bane); see also
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 4 6 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992) ("The use of standard policy provisions is founded upon the premise that collaboration
among casualty insurers is necessary to calculate and maintain reasonable rates. . . . It would seem
that the benefits of this standardization would be lost if standard form language were given different
meanings for different insureds based upon individual degrees of sophistication and bargaining
power.").
83.

ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 33-34 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION : ENDING THE P RIVATE C ONVERSATION

The ongoing debate about the potential efficiency of the common law
8
raises a structurally similar question here. 4 Two agents are candidates for
evolution in this context, with two potential spheres of efficiency. First, we
might expect that over time the courts will develop increasingly efficient
rules for the interpretation and application of boilerplate contracts, including
insurance contracts. Without taking a position on the general trend, this Ar
ticle reveals that courts are retaining various inefficient interpretive rules,
the goals of which (language alteration) are counter to the incentive created
(language perpetuation).
Second, we might hope that as the courts' interpretation of contracts
evolves, so would the contracts themselves. If the rules effectively blocked
the benefits of misleading language, drafters would draft more direct lan
guage. If the rules effectively punished drafters for sloppy language, they
would allow less of it to pass once, and none of it to pass twice. Poor lan
guage avoided is hard to show, and there are examples of helpful redrafts,
but contracts do not seem to be swept along in the inexorable march toward
clarity, brevity, and efficiency.
There is a difference between missing the basket and making a foul: the
lack of efficient evolution in interpretive rules is a missed opportunity, but
more, the intentional pursuit of efficiency by courts has resulted in actively
perverse incentives in the drafting of policies.
The first outcome no doubt has many causes, but to the extent courts de
fer to one another's ambiguity rulings, competitive evolutionary pressures
are relieved. The second outcome-perverse incentives to retain poor lan
guage-stems from the communal structure of boilerplate evolution, and the
collaborative structure of the insurance market. This structure, while perhaps
inevitable and perhaps desirable, limits competition on the policy front,
85
The key, however, is

shifting competition to price, package, and service.

knowing that the opinions should be read-knowing that a particular turn of
phrase in a clause refers to the judicial interpretation of a prior clause. This
sotto voce command to the courts can result in concealed meaning, or in
86
language that Goetz and Scott call "encrusted."

Notice that if the incentive given to insurers is to retain language that
has increased in certainty value by interpretation, courts seem to assume that

84. In chronological order, four highlights of the debate are: RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 320-28 ( ! st ed. 1 972) (opening shot); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. Pos
NER, THE EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW ( 1 987) (driving the point home); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 ( 1 992) (counter point); and Zywicki, supra
note 75 (game, set, match). The fact that the evolution of common law has inefficiencies makes the
law and economics approach to contracts more, not less, useful. See Richard Craswell, Jn That Case,
What ls the Question ? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 903 (2003).
85.

ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 33-38.

86. Goetz & Scott, supra note 44, at 289. Clauses are "encrust[ed]" by "an overlaying of
legal jargon to the point that the intelligibility of the language deteriorates significantly. Such boi
lerplate weakens the communicative properties of preforrnulations, reducing their reliability as
signals of what the parties really intend." Id.
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all future policyholders will be helped nonetheless. Those that go to court
will , and perhaps that is all some courts can see. The remaining policyhold
ers are harmed. Those who do not sue because they do not read the hidden
text into the unclear or misleading calcified language are not aided by the
fact that, had they sued, coverage would be found. Moreover, these policy
holders pay the increased premium for the judicially interpreted clause but
87
In short, the less sophisti

only demand coverage for the clause as written.

cated the policyholder, the greater the risk of harm-again, an outcome
opposite courts' intentions.
This Article uncovers numerous difficulties but points to one fairly obvi
ous solution: courts should be schooled in the nature of boilerplate creation,
including insurance drafting, and be wary of creating perverse incentives to
retain the very clauses they seek to change. As the trend in ordinary contract
interpretation parallels more closely that already taken with insurance con
tracts, courts should be aware of the consequences.
Specifically, while the reasonable expectations doctrine has an estab
lished place, its application should not be completely divorced from contract
language, or drafters will likewise divorce themselves from improving the
language. Moreover, compulsive application of contra proferentem to
clauses that are not ambiguous, but rather simply disputed, can also belittle
the role of language; to give drafters (and particularly, insurers) an incentive
to fix language, language must carry weight with the court.
As for insurers, one might wonder why the onus for change is not laid at
their own feet. First, the thrust of this Article is that courts have one aim but
unintentionally encourage another, often contrary, result. What is called for
is a better understanding of the process, not a more illusive change in moti
vation or appeal to the altruistic side of insurers. Second, to the extent
insurers already have a motivation to improve poor language, that motiva
tion might be unleashed if courts were to stop raising unnecessary hurdles.
Ending inartful overapplication of the reasonable expectation doctrine, for
example, could have substantial effect.
Similarly, those who believe in the strong incentives of the market sys
tem should be skeptical about what seems to be a failure of individual
insurers to grab the low-hanging fruit. Of course, again, this Article argues
that insurers are constrained by their collective endeavor in a way evident in
few other industries. In addition, it is not obvious that insurers aren't rela
tively content with the current system; the frustration of misconstrued
language might be outweighed by the importance of predictable language.
As long as insurers expect courts to systematically rule against them at
every margin, insurers may value nothing so highly as the ability to nail
courts down through precedent.
Conversations with industry insiders suggest that the "insurance crowd"
has internal rules about the way in which policies should be written, and
perhaps this prevents the kind of innovative policy writing market forces

87. See generally Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why In
surance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 7 1 ( 1 995).
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might predict.
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Insurers seem more comfortable with the old beat-up lan

guage they know than the innovative clear language that one might expect
would bring a market edge. It may well be true that in insurance, as in other
areas of life, "it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed
89
unconventionally." In other words, an insurance executive may be able to
keep her job and steadily advance, all the while endorsing ISO-drafted lan
guage that all other insurers are using, even if that language causes millions
or billions of dollars in litigation. After all, it is industry standard to use ISO
forms, not an individual decision for which the executive would be held ac
countable. On the other hand, proposing that your company depart from
industry language brings high risk with undervalued reward.
It should be remembered, however, that there are real costs to breaking
with the industry whole where the industry is otherwise cohesive. Whenever
language is redrafted, removed, or newly introduced, the store of past actu
arial data becomes either less relevant or useless. If all insurers embark on
this new adventure together, not only can they pool the new actuarial data
faster, but no one company will suffer relative to the others for the lan
90
guage's failings.
If, however, an insurer strikes out on its own, this
innovation brings the full cost of gathering actuarial data and the lonely
danger of the language leading to unexpected liability.
The industry that drafts together, sticks together, not just for future draft
ing, but for the pooling of loss data that comes in on the first draft. From
insurers, therefore, improvement will lie not in more individualized innova
tion, but in more industrywide redrafting. What should be discarded in the
end is not the standardized policy supported by mass actuarial data, but
those interpretive rules that create perverse incentives to retain weak lan
guage and create secret meaning.

88.
In THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, James Surowiecki attempts to explain the type of situation
where competitors are all too cautious when they each have an incentive to buck the received wis
dom. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
89. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY 1 58 ( 1 936), quoted in Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 35556 ( 1 996).
90.
This is an inexact generalization, of course. Some insurers will sell policies with the new
language more broadly than others, thereby bearing more risk should the language implode. Simi
larly, based on their other risks and investments, insurers vary in their ability to take large losses.

